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AN OVERVIEW OF NONMONOTONIC REASONING AND 
LOGIC PROGRAMMING* 
JACK MINKER 
D The focus of this paper is nonmonotonic reasoning as it relates to logic 
programming. I discuss the prehistory of nonmonotonic reasoning, starting 
from approximately 1958. I then review the research that has been accom- 
plished in the areas of circumscription, default theory, modal theories, and 
logic programming. The overview includes the major results developed, 
including complexity results that are known about the various theories. I 
then provide a summary which includes an assessment of the field and 
what must be done to further research in nonmonotonic reasoning and 
logic programming. a 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Classical logic has played a major role in computer science. It has been an 
important tool both for the development of architecture and of software. Logicians 
have contended that reasoning, as performed by humans, is also amenable to 
analysis using classical ogic. However, workers in the field of artificial intelligence 
have shown that classical logic is not sufficiently robust to adequately reason as 
humans do. Humans do not always reason as would a classical reasoning system. 
They leap to conclusions based on commonsense reasoning. By “commonsense 
reasoning” humans generally refer to such statements as “. . . it is my experience 
that ‘this’ must be the case” or “ . . . there is no good reason not to believe ‘this’.” 
The subject matter of nonmonotonic reasoning is that of developing reasoning 
systems that model the way in which common sense is used by humans. Nonmono- 
tonic reasoning must, therefore, be able to leap to conclusions and be sufficiently 
robust so that when a conclusion reached by nonmonotonic reasoning is shown to 
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be wrong, it may be revised. Nonmonotonic reasoning is based on classical logic, 
but it is a new logic developed exclusively by workers in artificial intelligence. It is a 
significant departure from the views of logicians and philosophers concerning 
humans and reasoning. Two other subjects related to classical logic are also 
discussed in this paper: logic programming and computational complexity. It is of 
interest to note that all three topics-nonmonotonic logic, logic programming, and 
computational complexity-are unique contributions made to logic by computer 
scientists. 
In this paper I address my remarks primarily to nonmonotonic reasoning as it 
relates to logic programming. I discuss the prehistory of nonmonotonic reasoning; 
what has been accomplished in the areas of circumscription, default theory, modal 
theories, and logic programming; and then provide a summary which includes an 
assessment of the field and what must be done to further nonmonotonic research. 
2. PREHISTORY OF NONMONOTONIC REASONING 
Nonmonotonic reasoning is connected intimately with the desire to perform 
commonsense reasoning in artificial intelligence (AI). McCarthy [135] was perhaps 
the first individual to discuss the need for the automation of commonsense 
reasoning, before any theory existed on the subject. Initial formalizations were 
propounded by McCarthy and Hayes [139], who discussed philosophical problems 
from the standpoint of AI and introduced the frame problem, and by Sandewall 
[1881, who attempted to find a solution to the frame problem (discussed in terms of 
robotics by Raphael [176]). The frame problem deals with how one specifies that 
when an action that is restricted to a set of objects takes place, the action has no 
effect upon many of the other objects in the world. 
Hayes [85] was perhaps the first to recognize the need for a nonmonotonic logic 
when he noted that rules of default fail to satisfy what he referred to as the 
extension property, which he stated all “respectable” logics should satisfy. A logical 
theory has the extension property iff whenever a formula is provable from a theory 
P, it is provable from any set P’ such that P c P’. The term “nonmonotonic 
reasoning” is probably attributable to Minsky’s “frame paper” [151]. Minsky 
informally addresses the notion of a frame (which does not relate to the frame 
problem) and states the following: 
A frame is a data-structure for representing a stereotype situation, like being in a 
certain kind of living-room, or going to a child’s birthday party. Attached to each 
frame are several kinds of information. Some of this is about how to use the frame. 
Some is about what one can expect to happen next. Some is about what to do if these 
expectations are not confirmed. 
The statement “about what to do if these expectations are not confirmed” is a 
default rule of some sort. This influential paper, in its original and widely 
disseminated form, had an appendix entitled “Criticism of the Logistic Approach.” 
In the appendix Minsky states the following: 
MONOTONICITY: Even if we formulate relevancy restrictions, logistic systems have 
a problem in using them. In any logistic system, all the axioms are necessarily 
“permissive’‘-they all help to permit new inferences to be drawn. Each added axiom 
means more theorems, none can disappear. There simply is no direct way to add 
information to tell such (sic) the about kinds of conclusions that should not be drawn! 
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To put it simply: If we adopt enough axioms to deduce what we need, we deduce far 
too many other things. But if we try to change this by adding axioms about relevancy, 
we still produce all the unwanted statements about their irrelevancy. 
Because Logicians are not concerned with systems that will later be enlarged, they 
can design axioms that permit only the conclusions they want. In the development of 
intelligence the situation is different. One has to learn which features of situations are 
important, and which kinds of deductions are not to be regarded seriously. 
Minsky summarizes his critique of logic as follows: 
“Logical” reasoning is not flexible enough to serve as a basis for thinking; I 
prefer to think of it as a collection of heuristic methods, effective only when 
applied to starkly simplified plans. The Consistency that Logic absolutely 
demands is not otherwise usually available-and probably not even desirable! 
-because consistent systems are likely to be too “weak.” 
I doubt the feasibility of representing ordinary knowledge effectively in the 
form of many small, independently “true” propositions. 
The strategy of complete separation of specific knowledge from general rules 
of inference is much too radical. We need more direct ways for linking 
fragments of knowledge to advice about how they are to be used. 
It was long believed that it was crucial to make all knowledge accessible to 
deduction in the form of declarative statements; but this seems less urgent as 
we learn ways to manipulate structural and procedural descriptions. 
Minsky wrote these statements in 1974. Indeed, in 1991 [1521 he holds the same 
view and states: 
This focus on well-defined problems produced many successful applications, no matter 
that the underlying systems were too inflexible to function well outside the domains 
for which they were designed. (It seems to me that this occurred because of the 
researcher’s excessive concern with consistency and provability. Ultimately this con- 
cern would be a proper one but not in the subject’s current state of immaturity.) 
At the time Minsky wrote his paper [151], he was commenting upon logic and 
noting that it was monotonic. Minsky’s views are, I believe, also shared by Herbert 
Simon. I believe that Minsky and Simon are more interested in cognitive modeling 
where logic has not been shown to be useful. What are we to make of these 
statements made by a distinguished colleague who is among the small number of 
founders of the field of artificial intelligence, and supported by another distin- 
guished founder of artificial intelligence? Have we answered their objections after 
these 15 to 20 years of work in nonmonotonic reasoning? Before I comment upon 
this, I would like to review what has been accomplished since 1974 in nonmono- 
tonic reasoning. 
3. NONMONOTONIC REASONING 
3.1. Beginning Research 
The start of the field of nonmonotonic reasoning is an outgrowth of McCarthy’s 
1958 paper on commonsense reasoing [135]. The paper by Hayes 1851 is another 
important early development. The Prolog programming language developed by 
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Colmerauer and his students 1341 and the PLANNER language developed by 
Hewitt 1871 were the first languages to have a nonmonotonic component. The not 
operator in Prolog and the THNOT capability in PLANNER provided default rules 
for answering questions about data where the facts did not appear explicitly in the 
program. 
The formalization of the field of nonmonotonic reasoning as we know it today 
started approximately in 1975/1976, with papers published in the 1977-1979 time 
period. Two important papers, one by Reiter 11771 and the other by Clark [33], 
appeared in the book Logic and Data Buses, edited by Gallaire and Minker [66]. 
Reiter set forth the rule of negation called the closed world assumption (CWA), 
which states that in Horn logic theories if we cannot prove an atom p, then we can 
assume not p. Clark related negation to the only if counterpart of if statements in 
a logic program. The if-and-only-if (iff) statements form a theory in which negated 
atoms can be proven using a full theorem prover. The importance of Clark’s 
observation is that he showed that, for ground atoms, an inference system called 
SLDNF resolution, operating on the if statements of logic programs, was sufficient 
to find the ground negated atoms in the iff theory that can be assumed true. These 
two rules of negation are, I believe, the first formalizations of nonmonotonic 
reasoning. McCarthy first introduced his theory of circumscription in 1977 [136], 
and Doyle developed his truth maintenance system in 1979 [42]. Reiter gave 
preliminary material on default reasoning in 1978 [178]. 
Nonmonotonic reasoning obtained its impetus in 1980 with the publication of an 
issue of the Artificial Intelligence Journal devoted exclusively to nonmonotonic 
reasoning. In that seminal issue the initial theories of nonmonotonic logic were 
presented. As noted by Bobrow in his “Editor’s Preface” to the journal, the 
approaches to nonmonotonic reasoning can be characterized broadly as falling in 
two different classes. The first approach extends the logic system in different ways. 
This is characterized in papers by McCarthy [137], who formalized his theory of 
circumscription introduced earlier [136]; by Reiter [1791, who introduced his theory 
of default reasoning; and by McDermott and Doyle [140], who used modal logic to 
handle nonmonotonicity. The second approach views logic as an object and extends 
the reasoning system with metadevices. This is explored by Weyrauch [211] and 
Winograd [212]. 
I will not describe all of these theories as there is not sufficient space to do so in 
this paper. I will focus on the first approach. The approach to nonmonotonic 
reasoning evidenced by circumscription, default reasoning, modal theories, and 
logic programming has led to a large literature since 1980. Building upon this work, 
numerous results have been obtained. I briefly review some of this work. A full 
treatment of all of the work is not possible here. Those of you who have a “pet” 
theory that is omitted, please forgive me. I must say that in preparing this paper I 
have been overwhelmed by the breadth and depth of the research that has been 
achieved since 1980. It is not possible to do justice here to all of the work. I have 
also decided not to include a discussion of truth maintenance systems. For 
approaches to the.semantics of these systems are references [184] and [42]-[44]. 
Ginsberg [78] has captured the significant developments in nonmonotonic logic 
up to approximately 1987 in his book Readings in Nonmonotonic Reasoning. This is 
a major source document for work up to that date. It consists of the original 
articles on the subject of nonmonotonic reasoning. Ginsberg ties the work together 
nicely with comments at the beginning of the book and interspersed throughout the 
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various sections. There are several major sections: background and historical 
papers; formalizations of nonmonotonic reasoning; truth maintenance; applications 
of nonmonotonic reasoning; and an appendix by Perlis that provides an extensive 
bibliography on nonmonotonic reasoning. Other extensive surveys of nonmono- 
tonic reasoning can be found in [26], [41], and [127]. As will be seen in the following 
sections, nonmonotonic logic has a rigorous mathematical basis. Although grounded 
in classical logic, it is a new discipline that extends classical logic and, in a short 
period of time (since 1980), has become a mature part of logic. A major textbook 
on the subject has been written by Marek and Truszczynski [134]. The book 
emphasizes work in default logic and autoepistemic reasoning. I will concentrate 
on the formalizations of nonmonotonic reasoning and their relationships to logic 
programming. See [181] for an earlier survey of the field. Books on the foundation 
of logic programming [123] and on the foundations of disjunctive logic program- 
ming [125] provide theoretical background on the semantics of logic programming 
including rules of negation. The collected works of John McCarthy [138] should be 
read, as it is fundamental to an understanding of thoughts that led to the 
development and foundation of nonmonotonic reasoning. 
3.2. Circumscription 
Circumscription has generated a great deal of interest in the nonmonotonic 
reasoning community. McCarthy’s 1980 paper on circumscription [137] is a formal- 
ization of the work he described first in [136]. Circumscription deals with the 
minimization of predicates subject to restrictions expressed by predicate formulas. 
If A is a sentence of a first-order language containing a predicate symbol 
P(x r, . . . ,xn), written P(X), then the result of replacing all occurrences of P in A 
by the predicate expression CD is written as A(@). The circumscription of P in 
A(P) is the sentence schema: for all @ 
[A(@) /vqqq 3P(X))] 3X(P(X) I@@)) 
which states that P is minimal among the predicates which make A(@,) true, in the 
sense that the only tuples X that satisfy P are those that have to-assuming the 
sentence A(P). McCarthy shows how a slight generalization allows circumscribing 
several predicates jointly. 
Lifschitz [117] modifies circumscription so that instead of being a single mini- 
mality condition, it becomes an “infinite conjunction” of “local” minimality condi- 
tions; each condition expresses the impossibility of changing the value of a 
predicate from true or fake at one point. This is referred to as pointwise 
circumscription. Lifschitz then defines prioritized circumscription, which provides for 
priorities between predicates. Lifschitz [116] describes the concept of parallel 
circumscription and also treats prioritized circumscription. Grosof [84] has general- 
ized prioritized circumscription to a partial order of priorities. 
Lifschitz [116] addresses the problem of computing circumscription. He notes 
that circumscription is difficult to implement because its definition involves a 
second-order quantifier. He introduces metamathematical results that allow, in 
some cases, circumscription to be replaced by an equivalent first-order formula. 
Etherington, Mercer, and Reiter [53] established results about the consistency of 
circumscription, showing that predicate circumscription cannot account for some 
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kinds of default reasoning and also provides no information about equality predi- 
cates. Perlis [162] shows the inadequacies of circumscription to deal with coun- 
terexamples. He has shown that circumscription suffers from some counterintuitive 
limitations concerning expectations on “counterexamples” to defaults. These limi- 
tations are not confined to circumscription, but are endemic to all nonmonotonic 
reasoning formalisms. Etherington, Kraus, and Perlis [52] develop a general ap- 
proach to solve the problem that involves restricting the scope of nonmonotonic 
reasoning and show that it remedies these problems in a variety of formalisms. 
They refer to their approach as scoped circumsctiption. Their solution requires no 
modification of the underlying formalisms, and the result is semantically compati- 
ble with existing approaches. The idea of scoping is to limit the applicability of the 
use of defaults to restricted situations rather than to broader classes to which it 
may not apply. Bertossi and Reiter [17] show that although circumscription does 
not give the expected results for characterizing the concept of a generic object in 
the context of a formalized mathematical theory, scoped circumscription provides 
the right mechanism. 
There have been other results about circumscription. Perlis and Minker 11651 
developed completeness results for circumscription. McCarthy’s original paper 
11371 discussed only the soundness of circumscription. Reiter 11801 was the first to 
relate circumscription to logic programming. Minker and Perlis [147] introduced 
protected circumsctiption and demonstrated how one can compute in this theory 
with logic programs. Subrahmanian and Lu [201] have extended the concept of 
protected circumscription. Gelfond, Przymusinska, and Przymusinski [76] relate a 
propositional form of circumscription to stratified theories. (See Chandra and 
Hare1 [30], Apt, Blair, and Walker [4], and Van Gelder [208] for work on stratified 
theories.) Minker, Lobo, and Rajasekar [146] complement the work by Gelfond, 
Przymusinaka, and Przymusinski [76] by developing a procedure to compute 
circumscription in disjunctive logic programs that are stratified. See, Lifschitz [1181 
for additional work in this area. 
Perlis [163] argues that sets play an important role in circumscription’s ability to 
deal in a general way with certain aspects of commonsense reasoning. He notes 
that sentences that, intuitively, one would want circumscription to prove are 
nonetheless not so provable without using sets. He shows that when sets are 
introduced, first-order circumscription handles these cases easily, obviating the 
need for second-order circumscription. 
Kraus, Perlis, and Horty [lo81 show that one can assess another’s ignorance by 
default using what they call autocircumscription, to assess our own ignorance of 
anything that might suggest he other’s knowing a given proposition P. They solve 
the Bush-Gorbachev problem, defined by McCarthy, to illustrate their approach. 
It is important to be able to compute in circumscriptive theories. The use of 
logic programming is a natural computation vehicle for a large class of circumscrip- 
tion problems as they both deal with the concept of minimal models. In general, it 
will be difficult to compute in circumscriptive theories, except for those that are 
equivalent to normal Horn theories, which allow a single atom in the head of a 
clause and literals in the body of a clause and also in the case of stratified 
disjunctive databases. Fernandez and Minker [59] develop a fixpoint operator for 
stratified disjunctive deductive databases that captures the pe$ect models of 
Przymusinski [168] and is able to compute prioritized circumscription. Przymusinski 
[169] has developed an algorithm to compute circumscription in a wide class of 
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circumscriptive theories. Ginsberg has implemented a circumscriptive theorem 
prover [79]. Nerode, Ng, and Subrahmanian [154] have developed and implemented 
algorithms to compute the preferred models of circumscriptive databases at com- 
pile-time using mixed integer linear programming techniques. Their method is 
bottom-up and permits reuse of previous computations. The method accommo- 
dates database updates. 
Schlipf [190] has shown that circumscription is II&complete. In disjunctive 
theories, the computational complexity increases so that unless the theory is 
near-Horn--in which there are log(n) non-Horn formulas, where n is the number 
of formulas in the theory-it will be computationally complex. 
Various nonmonotonic formalisms based on conditional entailment have been 
developed by Geffner [67], Pearl [159], Delgrande [36], and Ginsberg [77]. Condi- 
tional entailment bears some similarity to circumscription in that they both induce 
preferences between models. The original ideas on conditional entailment were set 
forth by Stalnaker [200] and Lewis [115]. For a detailed description of the role of 
conditionals in artificial intelligence, see Horty and Thomason [88]. 
3.3. Default Reasoning 
Default reasoning, developed by Reiter [179l, is an important approach to non- 
monotonic reasoning and is one of the more extensively studied formalisms of 
nonmonotonic reasoning. (See the book by Besnard [181 on default logic.) A default 
is a rule of the form y, whose meaning is intended to state “if CY is true, and it is 
consistent o assume that /3 is true, then conclude that y is true.” 
Default rules act as mappings from some incomplete theory to a more complete 
extension of the theory. An extension is a maximal set of conclusions that can be 
drawn from the default theory. Reiter defines a default heory to be a pair (D, W>, 
where D is a set of closed default rules and W is a set of first-order sentences. 
Extensions are defined by a fixed-point construction. For any set of first-order 
sentences S, define I(S) to be the smallest set satisfying the following three 
properties: 
1. WCIW. 
2. I(S) is closed under first-order logical consequence. 
3. If y is a default rule of D and cr E F(S) and T p @ S, then YE I(S). 
Then E is defined to be an extension of the default theory (D, W) iff T(E) = E, 
that is, E is a fixed point of the operator I. 
A theory consisting of general default rules does not always have an extension. 
A subclass consisting of default rules called normal defaults, and of the form y 
always has an extension. Reiter develops a complete proof theory for normal 
defaults and shows how it interfaces with a top-down resolution theorem prover. 
Reiter and Criscuolo [183] show that default rules may be normal when viewed 
in isolation; however, they can interact in ways that lead to derivations of anoma- 
lous default assumptions. Nonnormal default rules are required to deal with 
default interactions. Handling nonnormal default rules is computationally more 
complex than dealing with normal default rules. 
Gelfond, Lifschitz, Przymusinska, and Truszczynski [74] generalize Reiter’s 
default logic to handle disjunctive information. The generalization arises because 
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of difficulties with disjunctive information where there may be multiple extensions 
-one containing a sentence CY and another a sentence P-and the theory with a 
simple extension (Y V p. 
A disjunction default is an expression of the form 
~:Pi,“.,& 
Xl’. Ix 
where q,P1,...,Pm,~l,..., ‘y, (m, n 2 0) are quantifier-free formulas. Formula CY 
is the prerequisite of the default, pi,. . . , & are justifications, and yi,. . . , y,, 
disjoined, are its consequents. A disjunctiue default theory (ddt) is a set of disjunc- 
tive defaults. Gelfond et al. [74] show that one cannot simulate a ddt with a 
standard default theory. They note that ddt is a generalization of the semantics for 
disjunctive databases proposed by [72]. 
Baral and Subrahmanian 1131 show that even though all default theories do not 
necessarily have extensions, Reiter’s operator always has fixed-points over the 
power lattice. Such fixed-points indicate that when extensions do not exist, the 
original fixed-point operator may form a loop around possible extensions (sets of 
formulas). They refer to the class of such sets of formulas as strict extension classes, 
and define the extension class semantics. They also define well-founded semantics of 
default theories [12] as a particular extension class. 
Etherington and Reiter [541 use default logic to formalize NETL-like inheri- 
tance hierarchies [56]. They provide the first attempt at a semantics for such 
hierarchies, a provably correct inference algorithm for acyclic networks, a guaran- 
tee that the acyclic network has extensions, and a provably correct quasi-parallel 
inference algorithm for such networks. 
Lobo and Subrahmanian [126] show that given any disjunctive logic program P, 
the minimal Herbrand models of P are in a precise l-l correspondence with the 
default logic theory Ap obtained by adding to P the default logic schema 3. See 
Imielinski [90] for connections between default logic and circumscription. 
Selman [193], in an excellent thesis, explores three default reasoning formalisms. 
He obtains the first characterization of tractable forms of default reasoning. He 
also gives a high-level characterization of the main factors contributing to the 
intractability of the general reasoning. He considers the following formalisms: 
model-preference defaults, default reasoning [ 1791, and path-based defeasible inhen’- 
tance [204, 891. In model-preference defaults, the preference ordering on models is 
defined by statements of the form “a model where (Y holds is preferable to a model 
where p holds.” He proves that only systems with quite limited expressible power 
lead to tractable reasoning, e.g., _fZ%? and QCC, containing, respectively, Horn 
defaults and acyclic specificity-ordered Horn defaults. 
Kautz and Selman [loll and Selman [193] consider the complexity of various 
forms of propositional default reasoning. They consider unaly, disjunction-free 
ordered, ordered unary, disjunction-free normal, Horn, and normal unaly theories. 
These theories form a hierarchy, and Kautz and Selman show that to find an 
extension in disjunction-free and unary theories is NP-hard, whereas it is 8(n3) for 
the remaining theories. They also show that the complexity of determining if a 
given literal p appears in any extension of a Horn default theory or a normal unary 
theory is B(n), where n is the number of occurrences of literals in the theory, but 
otherwise is NP-hard. In skeptical theories where one wants to determine if a 
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literal is in all extensions, they show that for a normal unary theory the time-com- 
plexity is @(n’), where n is the number of occurrences of literals in the theory. For 
other theories it is co-NP. 
Path-based inheritance reasoning as defined by Touretzky is NP-hard, even 
when restricted to acyclic unambiguous networks. Horty, Thomason, and Touretzky 
[89] identify tractable forms of defeasible reasoning. Selman and Levesque [195, 
1961 show that the tractability of an inheritance theory depends upon the kinds of 
chaining involved in the path construction. Selman [193] further shows that the 
standard upward chaining notion of path construction leads to tractable algo- 
rithms; those definitions based on a double chaining notion lead to NP-complete 
algorithms. 
Papadimitriou and Sideri [1.58] show that all default theories that have no cycles 
(in some precise sense) have an extension, which can be found efficiently. They 
further prove that it is NP-complete to find extensions even for default theories 
with no prerequisites and at most two literals per default. They also characterize 
precisely the complexity of finding extensions in general default theories. The 
problem is I;[-complete. 
3.4. Modal Theories 
McDermott and Doyle [140] introduced a modal operator M into first-order logic. 
If p is a sentence in first-order logic, then Mp denotes the sentence in modal logic 
whose intended meaning is “p is consistent with what is known,” or “maybe p.” 
Moore [153] developed autoepistemic logic @EL), which is an improvement of 
the work by McDermott and Doyle. Instead of using a “possibly” modal operator, 
he uses a “necessarily” modal operator L. Intuitively, Lp is to be read as “I know 
p.” Moore reconstructs nonmonotonic logic as a model of an ideally rational 
agent’s reasoning about its own beliefs. He defines a semantics for which he shows 
that autoepistemic logic is sound and complete. There is a strong relationship 
between the two modalities, as p is possible if-and-only-if 7 p is not necessary. 
Hence, Mp is equivalent to 7 L 7 p. Ginsberg shows the relationship between 
autoepistemic logic and Kripke’s approach to modal logic [1091. As observed by 
Shvarts [198], AEL is one of the nonmonotonic logics that can be obtained from 
the approach of McDermott and Doyle [141]. 
Levesque [114] generalizes Moore’s notion of a stable expansion [153] to the full 
first-order case. He provides a semantic account of stable expansions in terms of a 
second modal operator @, where B(W) is read as “w is all that is believed.” He 
characterizes stable expansion as: a(w) is true exactly when all formulas that are 
believed form a stable expansion of W. Perlis [164] and Lifschitz [119] have 
developed variants of circumscription analogous to autoepistemic logic. 
Although default logic and autoepistemic logic are seemingly different, and are 
motivated by slightly different concerns, Konolige [103, 1041 shows that autoepis- 
temic logic can be strengthened so that there is an equivalence between the 
propositional form of both logics. He gives an effective translation of default logic 
into autoepistemic logic and shows there is a reverse translation; every set of 
sentences in autoepistemic logic can be effectively rewritten as a default theory. 
Marek and Truszczynski [131] extend the work by Konolige. They take a 
syntactic approach to investigating the relationships between autoepistemic and 
104 J. MINKER 
default logics. They state: 
In each logic we find three classes of objects-minimal sets closed under defaults, 
weak extensions, extensions for default logic, and minimal stable theories, expansions 
and robust expansions for autoepistemic logic-so that for a default theory (D, W), E 
is a minimal set closed under defaults (respectively weak extension, extension) if and 
only if E is the objective part of a minimal stable theory (respectively expansion, 
robust expansion) for the autoepistemic interpretation of (D,W). Similar results for 
the converse direction hold only in the case of minimal stable sets and minimal sets 
closed under defaults, and expansions and weak expansions. A weaker result holds for 
robust expansions and extensions. 
Truszczynski [205] develops a natural modal interpretation of defaults. He shows 
that under this interpretation there are whole families of modal nonmonotonic 
logics that accurately represent default reasoning. He applies the method to logic 
programs and obtains results that relate stable models to several classes of 
S-expansions. His results show that there is no single modal logic for describing 
default reasoning and that there exist a whole range of modal logics that can be 
used in the embedding as a “host” logic. 
Marek and Subrahmanian [130] show the relationship between supported mod- 
els of normal programs and expansions of autoepistemic theories. Gelfond [68] 
shows that general logic programs can be translated into autoepistemic theories. 
Gelfond and Lifschitz [70] show that stable model semantics is also equivalent to 
the translation of logic programs into autoepistemic theories as proposed by 
Gelfond. Lifschitz [118] shows that autoepistemic logic, stable models, and intro- 
spective circumscription provide three equivalent descriptions of the meaning of 
propositional logic programs. Lifschitz also notes that default logic and autoepis- 
temic logic provide more expressive possibilities that apparently have no counter- 
part in circumscription, except in the versions of Perlis and Lifschitz. 
Przymusinski [172] notes several drawbacks of autoepistemic logic; notably, 
some “reasonable” theories are often inconsistent in AEL; even for consistent 
theories AEL does not always lead to expected semantics; it insists upon com- 
pletely deciding all of our beliefs; and it does not offer flexibility in terms of 
selecting application-dependent formalisms on which to base our beliefs. He shows 
that autoepistemic logics of closed beliefs of Moore coincides with autoepistemic 
logic of closed beliefs in which the negative introspection operator used is Reiter’s 
CWA. He then extends autoepistemic logic to generalized autoepistemic logic 
(GAEL), which uses Minker’s generalized closed world assumption [142] as the 
basis for the negative introspection operator, and demonstrates how other forms of 
AEL may be achieved. 
Lifschitz [120] brings together work by Reiter [1821 and Levesque [1121, who 
discuss query evaluation in databases that are treated as first-order formulas that 
also contain an epistemic modal operator, and work in epistemic formulas used in 
knowledge representation for expressing defaults. He describes a new version of 
the logic of grounded logic, proposed by Lin and Shoham [122], which is similar to 
the Levesque-Reiter theory of epistemic queries. Using this formalism, he gives 
meaning to epistemic queries in the context of logic programming and can ask, 
“What does a program know?” Because Lifschitz’s version of the logic of grounded 
knowledge contains some forms of default logic, he is able to give meaning to 
epistemic queries in the context of a default theory or a circumscriptive theory. 
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Lifschitz’s logic as well as the logic of Lin and Shoham is bimodal. Lifschitz’s logic 
contains the full propositional default logic by Reiter [179]. 
Konolige [ 1051 discusses quantification in autoepistemic logic and proposes 
several different semantics, all based on the idea that having beliefs about an 
individual amounts to having a belief using a certain type of name for the 
individual. 
Marek and Truszczynski [132] systematically study properties of AEL. A major 
issue in AEL is to define semantics for programs with negation. Gelfond [681 
observed that the logic program p + q, not I can be expressed in autoepistemic 
logic as q A 7Kr =+p, where K is the modal operator interpreted to be “is 
known.” He showed that the theory obtained by translating the clauses of a 
stratified logic program has a unique expansion. Marek and Truszczyfiski [132] 
extend the work of Gelfond and show that there is a wide class of theories 
(stratified theories) that possess a unique expansion. Their results imply algorithms 
to determine whether a theory has a unique expansion. They develop connections 
between autoepistemic logic and stable model semantics for logic programs and 
prove that the problem of existence of stable models is NP-hard. 
Marek and Truszczynski [1331 also introduce the concept of weak extensions and 
study its properties. The notion of weak extensions permits a precise description of 
the relationship between default and autoepistemic logics. They show that default 
logic with weak extensions is essentially equivalent to autoepistemic logic. It is 
nonmonotonic logic KD 45 (which corresponds to Moore’s autoepistemic logic). 
They study the notion of a set of formulas closed under a default theory and show 
that they correspond to stable theories and to modal logic S,. They further show 
that skeptical reasoning with sets closed under default theories is closely related 
with provability in S,. They provide complexity results. 
See Gottlob [821 and Niemela [157] for complexity results involving expansions 
of default theories and autoepistemic expansions. In view of the relationships 
between the alternative theories, the tractability results of Kautz and Selman [loll 
and Selman [193] may apply to autoepistemic theories. 
4. LOGIC PROGRAMMING 
In the previous sections we have noted where the alternative nonmonotonic 
theories relate to logic programming. In this section we describe how logic 
programming incorporates the ability to handle data in a nonmonotonic fashion. 
Work in logic programming and nonmonotonic reasoning deals with the handling 
of negation. We consider two types of negation in logic programs: negation by rules 
of default and logical negation. There has been a large amount of work in these 
areas. The work relates to normal logic programs, normal disjunctive logic programs, 
extended logic programs, and extended disjunctive logic programs. In a normal 
disjunctive program there may be a positive disjunction in the head of a clause, and 
a conjunction of atoms and atoms preceded by a default rule of negation written as 
not in the body of a clause. In an extended disjunctive logic program there may be 
a disjunction of literals in the head of a clause (where a literal is an atom or the 
logical negation of an atom, written T 1, and the body may contain a conjunction of 
literals and literals preceded by a default rule of negation. An extended clause is 
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written as 
4 v a.0 Vlk+lk+l ,..., I,, notl,+I ,..., notl, 
where 1 1,. . . ,I, are literals and k I m I n. The explicit use of classical negation 
suggests the introduction of a new truth value, namely, logical falsehood (in 
contrast to falsehood by failure) in the semantics, 
When k = 1 and literals in the head and body of the clause are atoms, we refer 
to the clause as a normal clause. When k = 1 and literals in the head and body 
need not be atoms, we refer to the clause as an extended clause. When k > 1 and 
literals in the head and body are restricted to atoms, then we refer to the clause as 
a normal disjunctive clause. When k > 1 and literals in the head and body are not 
restricted to atoms, we refer to the clause as an extended disjunctive clause. 
The major issue with respect to nonmonotonicity is the way in which the default 
rule of negation is used to develop the semantics of the set of clauses that 
constitute the logic program. There have been a large number of different theories. 
This section is subdivided into several subsections, which deal with the following: 
normal and extended logic programs; disjunctive logic programs; abductive logic 
programs; and complexity and properties of logic programs. In each subsection the 
relationships between alternative logic programs and their relationships to the 
three major classes of nonmonotonic reasoning are described. 
4.1. Normal and Extended Logic Programs 
In the case of normal logic programs, theories of negation for Horn theories have 
been developed: the closed world assumption (CWA) [177], Clark’s completion 
theory [33], and Chan’s [291 constructive negation. Whereas Clark, using SLDNF, can 
find answers to negated ground atoms, it does not work for non-ground atoms. 
Chan’s constructive negation solves this problem. In the case of Horn theories 
there is a single model, given by the unique minimal model of the program [47]. 
Theories then exist for stratified normal programs and normal programs in general. 
In the area of stratified programs, there is a single meaning that can be ascribed to 
a program, as developed by Apt, Blair, and Walker [41, and referred to as the 
per$ect model by Przymusinski [168]. In the area of normal programs that are not 
stratified, there are several competing theories: the theory of stable models devel- 
oped by Gelfond and Lifschitz [70]; the theory of well-founded semantics developed 
by Van Gelder, Ross, and Schlipf [210] and elaborated upon by Przymusinski [170]; 
the theory of generalized well-founded semantics by Baral, Lobo, and Minker [lo]; 
and the theory of stable classes developed by Baral and Subrahmanian [13]. As 
shown by Baral and Subrahmanian [12], the concept of stable classes is able to 
capture both the notion of stable models and the well-founded semantics. 
There have been a large number of papers that relate to well-founded semantics, 
to stable semantics, to the relationships between them and the three methods of 
nonmonotonic reasoning described in the previous sections, and to computing in 
these semantics. We discuss some of these results below. 
In the area of well-founded semantics, Fitting [63,64] has shown how well-founded 
semantics extends naturally to a family of lattice-based logic programming lan- 
guages. The generalization simplifies the proofs of the basic results in well-founded 
semantics. Chen and Warren [31] developed a goal-oriented method, XOLDTNF 
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resolution, of computing the well-founded semantics. The inference system extends 
OLDT resolution developed by Tamaki and Sato [203] in that the truth value of an 
answer to a query may be undefined, due to the three-valued nature of the 
well-founded semantics. They avoid negative loops in the computation by negative 
contexts. The inference system provides a smooth interface with Prolog. 
In the area of stable model semantics, Kakas and Mancarella [lOOI define a class 
of stable theories by treating negation in any logic program as a form of hypothesis. 
The definition is given in terms of a stability property on negative hypotheses that 
corresponds to negation-as-failure literals which attempt to formalize the usual 
understanding of a default rule of negation. The stable theories generalize stable 
models. They also identify a “minimal” semantics for any logic program analogous 
to the well-founded semantics. Their work provides a means to generalize autoepis- 
temic reasoning and applies to work in abductive reasoning. Ng and Subrahmanian 
[155, 1561 investigate Dempster-Shafer [37] probabilistic logic programs and de- 
velop a declarative semantics for this class. They transform each such program into 
a new program whose clauses may contain nonmonotonic negations in their bodies 
and develop a stable semantics for the new program. Hence, the meaning of a 
Dempster-Shafer theory is identical to that of the transformed program as defined 
by the stable semantics. Fernandez, Lobo, Minker, and Subrahmanian 1571 have 
shown how to compute the stable model semantics by transforming the logic 
program into a disjunctive logic program that contains integrity constraints. They 
show that the stable models of the original program are the minimal models of the 
transformed disjunctive logic program. In the case of deductive databases, they 
develop algorithms to operate over the model tree of the disjunctive theory so as to 
answer queries in the stable model semantics. The model tree is a shared structure 
that contains the minimal models of the disjunctive deductive database. Marek, 
Nerode, and Remmel [129] classify the Turing complexity of stable models of finite 
and recursive predicate logic programs. They show that up to a recursive l-l 
encoding, the sets of all stable models of a finite predicate logic program and the 
II: classes (the sets of all finite branches of a recursive tree) coincide. 
In their work on stable classes, Baral and Subrahmanian [13] introduce the idea 
of extension classes for default logics and of stable classes for logic programs which 
generalize the extension and stable model semantics, respectively. They are able to 
reason about inconsistent default theories and about logic programs with inconsis- 
tent completions. They extend the results of Marek and Truszczynski [131] relating 
to logic programs and default logics. Marek and Subrahmanian [130] develop 
connections between stable and supported models. They show relationships be- 
tween supported models and default logic. They develop conditions which guaran- 
tee that for every normal logic program P there exists a default theory (D, W) that 
relates to the supported models of P. They show further connections between 
supported models of a program an expansions of the program’s autoepistemic 
translation. 
The relationships that exist between stable model and well-founded semantics 
have been investigated by a large number of individuals. Baral and Subrahmanian 
[121 show the duality between stable class theory and the well-founded semantics 
for logic programs. In the stable class semantics, classes that were minimal with 
respect to Smyth’s power domain ordering [199] were selected. The well-founded 
semantics then corresponds to a class that is minimal with respect to Hoare’s 
power domain ordering: the dual of Smyth’s ordering. The result also suggests how 
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to define a well-founded semantics for default logic in such a way that the dualities 
that hold for logic programs continue to hold for default theories. They further 
show how the same techniques may be applied to “strong” autoepistemic logic: the 
logic of strong expansions as proposed by Marek and Truszczynski [131]. 
Przymusinski [170] shows that the well-founded semantics coincides with the 
three-valued stable model semantics. Dung [451 shows that stable semantics can be 
defined in the same way as well-founded semantics based on the basic notion of 
unfounded sets, and thus stable semantics can be considered to be a “two-valued 
well-founded semantics.” He further provides an axiomatic characterization of 
stable and well-founded semantics of logic programs, called strong completion. Like 
Clark’s [331 completion, strong completion can be interpreted in either two-valued 
or three-valued logics. He shows that two-valued strong completion specifies the 
stable model semantics while three-valued strong completion specifies the well- 
founded semantics. The call-consistency condition, as developed by Kunen.[llO], is 
sufficient for the existence of at least one stable model. Gire [81] exhibits a 
condition on the syntax of logic programs with negation, the semi-strictnessproperty 
(referred to as the call-consistency property by Kunen [llo]), which assures the 
equivalence of the well-founded semantics and the stable semantics in the sense 
that the well-founded model of an effectively semi-strict program P is total 
if-and-only-if P has a unique stable model. This class of programs strictly contains 
the effectively stratifiable programs. Subrahmanian, Nau, and Vago [202] develop 
techniques to compute the well-founded model of a logic program. Experiments 
with their implementation compare favorably with the standard alternating fixpoint 
computation [12, 2091. They compute the stable models of a deductive database by 
first computing the well-founded semantics and then use a branch-and-bound 
strategy to compute the stable models. 
Gelfond and Lifschitz [71] expand the class of logic programs to include logical 
negation ( 7), in addition to negation-as-failure. They base their semantics on 
stable models. They argue that some facts of commensense reasoning can be 
represented more easily when classical negation is available. Computationally, 
classical negation can be eliminated from extended programs by a simple transfor- 
mation that changes a classically negated atom 7 to a new atom p’. 
Gelfond [69] expands the syntax and semantics of logic programs and deductive 
databases to allow for the correct representation of incomplete information in the 
presence of multiple extensions. He expands the language of logic programs with 
classical negation, epistemic disjunction, and negation-as-failure by a new modal 
operator K (where for the set of rules T and formulas F, KF denotes “F is known 
to be true by a reasoner with a set of premises T”). Sets of rules in the extended 
language are called epistemic specijications. Epistemic theories differ from au- 
toepistemic theories in their use of the different connectives. 
Bell, Nerode, Ng, and Subrahmanian [14] focus their attention on the computa- 
tion and implementation of nonmonotonic deductive databases. Their approach 
differs from the conventional approaches. They base their method on using linear 
programming-based automated inference as introduced by Jeroslow [971 instead of 
using the Robinson resolution method [1851. They concentrate their development 
on compilers which move as much of the deduction to compile-time as possible. 
They compare, implement, and experiment with linear constraints corresponding to 
several uses of “classical” negation in logic programs. 
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For a detailed description of negation in logic programs, current up to 1988, see 
Shepherdson [197]. For a thorough survey of negation in rule-base database 
languages, see Bidoit [19]. The Bidoit survey focuses on the problems of defining 
the declarative semantics of logic programs with negation. Negation based on 
hxpoint techniques, three-valued logic, and nonmonotonic logics are presented for 
positive logic programs, (locally) stratified logic programs, and unstratifiable logic 
programs. 
4.2. Disjunctive Logic Programming 
In the area of disjunctive logic programming, there are also several approaches to 
negation: the generalized closed world assumption (GCWA) developed by Minker 
[142] and a derivative of this theory, the extended closed world assumption [75, 861, 
that apply to disjunctive logic programs. The model theoretic definition of the 
GCWA states that one can conclude the negation of a ground atom if it is false in 
all minimal Herbrand models. The proof theoretic definition states that one can 
conclude not a if for any disjunction of atoms, B, if a V B is provable from the 
program, then B is provable. The proof theoretic and model theoretic definitions 
are equivalent [142]. The concept of minimal models is closely related to McCarthy’s 
circumscription, which also deals with minimal models. Minker and Rajasekar 11481 
describe how one can compute in this theory. The GCWA is needed for disjunctive 
theories since Reiter [177] has shown that the CWA is inconsistent with respect to 
disjunctive theories. A weaker form of the GCWA, the weak generalized closed 
world assumption (WGCWA) was developed by Rajasekar, Lobo, and Minker [174]. 
The complexity of the WGCWA is the same as that of the CWA. The WGCWA is 
equivalent to the disjunctive database rule (DDR), developed by Ross and Topor 
[187]. Lobo [124] has extended constructive negation to apply to normal disjunctive 
logic programs. 
There have been a number of theories for normal disjunctive logic programs. 
Each of these theories is different and one does not imply the other. These are: 
generalized disjunctive well-founded semantics (GDWFS) developed by Baral, Lobo, 
and Minker [8, 91; wF3 semantics by Baral, Lobe, and Minker [ll]; WFS for 
disjunctive theories by Ross [186]; disjunctive well-founded semantics (DWFS) by 
Baral 161; and stationary semantics by Przymusinski [171]. A procedural semantics 
exists for the GDWFS and WF3. The procedures are based on linear resolution with 
selection function for indefinite clauses (SLI). This inference system was developed 
by Minker and Zanon [1501 and renamed by Minker and Rajasekar [148]. It 
requires the use of ancestry resolution and factoring, and hence is more complex 
than SLD resolution, which is used for Horn theories. Lobo, Minker, and 
Rajasekar [125] have written a research monograph that provides the basic founda- 
tion for disjunctive logic programming. They provide a formal treatment of the 
three semantics for disjunctive logic programs: fixpoint, model theoretic, and proof 
theory. They describe two forms of default negation; the generalized closed world 
assumption (GCWA) [142] and variations on that assumption, the weak generalized 
closed world assumption (WGCWA) [174, 1871. 
Baral [5] gives a classification of various iterative tixpoint semantics of normal 
and disjunctive logic programs. He develops a unifying framework that captures the 
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generalized well-founded semantics, well-founded semantics, generalized disjunc- 
tive well-founded semantics, and various other fixpoint semantics of disjunctive 
logic programs. It is not clear, however, which of these theories should be used and 
under what circumstances. For additional work in this area, see Bidoit and 
Froidevaux [20], Bidoit and Hull [21], and Bossu and Siegel [25]. 
Fernandez and Minker [60-621 develop methods to deal with disjunctive deduc- 
tive databases. They present the theory and algorithms to obtain answers to queries 
for disjunctive, stratified, and stable theories. They use model trees, as described 
originally in [58]. 
Przymusinski [1721 introduces the stable model semantics for disjunctive logic 
programs and disjunctive deductive databases. This generalizes the stable model 
semantics for normal logic programs. Depending upon whether only total (two-val- 
ued) or all partial (three-valued) models are used, one obtains the disjunctive stable 
semantics or the partial disjunctive stable semantics, respectively. He shows the 
following results: for normal programs, disjunctive (respectively, partial disjunctive) 
stable semantics coincides with stable (respectively, partial stable) semantics; for 
normal programs, partial disjunctive stable models coincide with well-founded 
semantics; for locally stratified disjunctive programs, both (total and partial) 
disjunctive semantics coincide with the perjkt model semantics; the work extends to 
disjunctive programs with classical negation; after translation of a program P into 
a suitable autoepistemic theory p the disjunctive (respectively, partial disjunctive) 
stable semantics of P coincides with the autoepistemic (respectively, three-valued 
autoepistemic) semantics of p. Alferes and Pereira [l] define a parameterizable 
schema to encompass and characterize a diversity of proposed semantics for 
extended logic programs. By adjusting their parameters they can specify several 
semantics using two kinds of negation: stationary [171], extended stable semantics 
[173] and well-founded semantics [210]. Minker and Ruiz [149] develop general 
techniques for dealing with extended disjunctive logic programs and extend the 
model, fixpoint, and proof theories of an arbitrary semantics of normal disjunctive 
logic programs to cover the case of extended programs. Illustrations of these 
techniques are given for stable models, disjunctive well-founded and stationary 
semantics. They summarize results on the declarative complexity of extended logic 
programs and the algorithmic complexity of the proof procedures analyzed. 
Inoue, Koshimura, and Hasegawa [941 develop a system that computes answers 
to function-free extended logic programs and extended disjunctive deductive 
databases. They use bottom-up incremental, backtrack-free computation of the 
minimal models of positive disjunctive programs, together with integrity constraints 
over beliefs and disbeliefs. 
Gelfond and Lifschitz [73] extend the work of Eshghi and Kowalski [50], Evans 
[55], and Apt and Bezem [2] on representing actions in logic programming lan- 
guages with negation-as-failure. Extended logic programs are used for this purpose. 
The method is applicable to temporal projection problems with incomplete infor- 
mation, as well as reasoning about the past. Bonatti [231 shows that a three-valued 
autoepistemic logic provides a unifying framework for most of the major semantics 
of normal logic programs. The framework extends to disjunctive logic programs and 
induces the natural counterparts of the well-founded and the stable model seman- 
tics. The resulting semantics are different from the stationary semantics [171], the 
generalized disjunctive well-founded semantics [8], and its extension, WF3 1111. 
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4.3. Abductive Logic Programming 
Abductive reasoning is an important part of commonsense reasoning. Abduction is 
the process of finding explanations for observations in a given theory. There have 
been two major approaches to abduction: one based on logic as defined by Selman 
and Levesque [196] and described in Kakas, Kowalski, and Toni [981; the other 
based on set-covering methods are given in the book by Peng and Reggia [160]. We 
discuss only the logic-based approach. 
The formal definition of abductive reasoning is that given a set of sentences T (a 
theory), and a sentence G (an observation), the abductive task is to find a set of 
sentences A (abductive explanation for G) such that: 
1. TuAkG; 
2. T U A is consistent; 
3. A is minimal with respect to set inclusion [196, 98, 281. 
A comprehensive survey and critical overview of the extension of logic program- 
ming to perform abductive reasoning (referred to as abducttie logic programming) 
is given in [98] together with an extensive bibliography on abductive reasoning. 
They outline the framework of abduction and its applications to default reasoning, 
and they introduce an argumentation theoretic approach to the use of abduction as 
an interpretation of negation-as-failure. They show that abduction has strong links 
to extended disjunctive logic programming. Abduction is shown to generalize 
negation-as-failure to include not only negative but also positive hypotheses, and to 
include general integrity constraints. They show that abductive logic programming 
is related to the justification-based truth maintenance system of Doyle [42] and the 
assumption-based truth maintenance system of de Kleer [35]. For a summary of 
complexity results on abductive reasoning, see the excellent survey by Cadoli and 
Schaerf [281. For other work on abductive reasoning see [48-51,91-93,95,96,1611. 
A formal definition of abductive logic programming is given by Kakas and 
Mancarella [99] to be a triple {P, r,3}, where P is a normal logic program, r is a 
set of abduciblepredicates, and I is a set of integrity constraints. A generalized stable 
model of {P, I’,Y} is defined as the stable model of P U E which satisfies .Y, where 
E is any set of ground atoms with predicates from r (E plays the role of A in the 
previous definition of abductive reasoning). In abductive logic programming the 
presence of integrity constraints restricts, even further, the possibilities for the 
ground atoms in E. This is a stronger condition than simple consistency. 
Satoh and Iwayama [189] propose a procedure for abduction that is correct for 
any abductive framework. If the procedure succeeds, there is a set of hypotheses 
which satisfies a query, and if it finitely fails, there is no such set. They guarantee 
correctness as they adopt a forward evaluation of rules and check consistency of 
“implicit deletion.” Because of the forward evaluation of rules they can handle 
arbitrary integrity constraints. Denecker and De Schreye [381 develop a family of 
extensions of SLDNF resolution for normal abductive programs. They can handle 
non-ground abductive goals. A completion semantics is given and the soundness 
and completeness of the procedures has been proven. A framework is provided by 
abductive procedures, in which a number of parameters can be set, to fit the 
abductive procedure to the application considered. In a personal conversation, 
Inoue stated that he and his colleagues are relating abductive logic programming 
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with disjunctive logic programming. He transforms an abductive logic program to a 
disjunctive logic program whose stable models correspond to the generalized stable 
models of the abductive logic program. 
4.4. Complexity and Properties of Logic Programs 
Apt and Blair [3] show that, for all n, there exists a logic program P such that the 
standard model of P is Ct-complete. The same result applies to default and 
autoepistemic logics, as shown by Apt and Blair, and also by Marek and 
Truszczynski [ 1311. 
The close relationship between circumscription and logic programming is impor- 
tant, as we know how to compute in the case of logic programs. However, the 
computational complexity is high if the circumscriptive theory is disjunctive. 
Chomicki and Subrahmanian [32] show that computing the GCWA is disjunctive 
theories is highly complex; it is #-complete. Cadoli and Lenzerini [27] provide 
complexity results of closed world reasoning and circumscription for the proposi- 
tional case. They provide complexity results for the CWA, GCWA, and EGCWA 
for the following theories: Horn (at most one positive literal per clause); dual-Horn 
(at most one negative literal per clause); Krom (at most two literals per 
clause-either positive or negative); definite (exactly one positive literal per 
clause); Horn-Krom (Horn and Krom); dual-Horn-Krom (dual-Horn and Krom); 
HomKromP (HornKrom with no negative clauses having two literals); 2-positive- 
Krom (exactly two positive literals, and no negative literal, per clause). Schlipf [191, 
1921 addresses the problems as to when closed world reasoning is tractable and the 
expressive power of logic programming semantics. 
Selman and Kautz [1941 propose to approximate disjunctive theories by bound- 
ing the set of models from below and from above by Horn theories. If X is the set 
of clauses in the theory and J%(C) is the set of minimal models of C, the lower and 
upper bounds yield the following approximations: 
The use of approximate answers is an interesting approach, as it can lead to fast 
answers, and the user can decide whether or not it is desirable to obtain the 
complete answer. Selman and Kautz note that the notion of Horn upper bound can 
be viewed as an abstraction of the original theory, because the upper bound is a 
more general, weaker theory. They show that the notion of abstraction as intro- 
duced for disjunctive theories by Borgida and Etherington [24] corresponds to the 
least Horn upper bound of the theories they consider. Borgida and Etherington 
also discuss some disjunctive theories in which one can compute reasonably. 
For a comprehensive survey and extensive bibliography on complexity results for 
nonmonotonic logics, see Cadoli and Schaerf [28]. 
We have described a large number of different theories of negation for normal 
logic programs and normal disjunctive logic programs. What should one make of 
them? What should be done when a system is needed that will handle normal or 
normal disjunctive logic programs? Which theory should be used? No insights have 
been developed except, perhaps, that each developer of a theory probably favors 
his own. Since my students and I have developed several theories of negation, we 
favor each one on different days. There also are no guidelines for the difficulty in 
computing answers to problems, and in some cases there are no procedures to 
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compute answers to the theory. One promising approach has been taken by Dix 
[39] to characterize the semantics of a program according to their properties. He 
suggests that the selection of a method be based upon general properties of 
nonmonotonic inference operations in the spirit of Kraus, Lehmann, and Magidor 
[107]. He suggests that the decision as to the semantics to be used be based on 
general principles, two of which he calls cumulativity and rationality. He has 
compared different semantics according to these properties and others for normal 
logic programs. 
Lehmann and his colleagues have extended the work of [1071. In [65] they 
compare the rule of rational monotonic& of [107] and different rules expressing 
some weak forms of transitivity and contraposition. They present four -weak forms of 
transitivity that, in preferential logic, are equivalent to contraposition. They are 
able to clarify some points about circumscription and show, for example, that the 
relations defined by circumscription do not satisfy, in general, contraposition. In 
[ill] they study, in inference systems, the following question: Given a knowledge 
base KB, what are the assertions that are entailed by KB? They argue that any 
reasonable nonmonotonic inference procedure should produce a set of conse- 
quences that satisfy properties like cautious monotonic@ and rationality (among 
others) and they denote by rational any extension of KB that satisfies them. The 
desired set of consequences of KB is the minimal rational extension of KB (with 
respect to a particular preferential order). Of interest is that in the propositional 
case, this particular rational extension is computationally tractable, that is, it is 
decidable in polynomial time. 
As a continuation of his earlier work, Dix [40] deals with disjunctive theories. He 
introduces additional interesting principles to compare semantics: modulatity, 
relevance, and the principle of partial evaluation. The satisfaction of these properties 
is related to the complexity of the semantics. He shows that these properties are 
not all satisfied by some existing semantics (e.g., the stationary semantics [171]). He 
defines additional semantics for normal disjunctive theories that have many if not 
all of these so-called desired properties. 
It is not clear, however, why the criteria suggested by Dix or by Lehmann and 
his colleagues are ones that should be used in selecting a semantics for normal 
logic or normal disjunctive logic programs. However, the fact that satisfying some 
of these properties leads to tractable theories is of considerable interest. More 
work is required here. Although we have come a long way, there is still a long way 
to go. 
5. SUMMARY 
Having reviewed the literature in logic programming and nonmonotonic reasoning, 
I have been impressed by the depth and maturity of the work. It is also impressive 
that most of the research, following the seminal 1980 Artificial Intelligence Journal, 
has taken place since 1986, which is the year of a workshop on deductive databases 
and logic programming that I organized [143]. I would like to believe that the 
workshop and the book that presented the important papers from the workshop, 
has had some influence on the direction of the research. The research indicates 
several mature theories including circumscription, default reasoning, autoepistemic 
logic, and negation in logic programming and disjunctive logic programming. Not 
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only have these theories been explicated formally, but there exist several results 
with respect to their tractability. Furthermore, the relationships between the 
theories have started to develop. 
A fundamental theme that I detect is that implementation of the alternative 
nonmonotonic theories has been achieved mostly through logic programs or 
disjunctive logic programs with some exceptions: for example, the implementation 
of Ginsberg’s theorem prover, MVL [79, SO]. For other work on implementation of 
nonmonotonic theories, see the description of the Theorist system of Poole, 
Goebel, and Aleliunas [1671. The theories that have been developed also provide 
mechanisms to handle the default rules that are implied in Minsky’s frame paper 
[1511. If one looks at the problems that have been proposed for solution that are 
nonmonotonic, there are many that are function-free. If this is the case, then one 
can use techniques from deductive databases to solve these problems. Work in 
deductive databases has matured to the point where we may expect such systems to 
become widely available. There are currently several systems that have been 
developed in laboratories and universities [207, 175, 166, 2061. The Bull Corpora- 
tion in France is developing a deductive database system for the market place that 
is expected to be announced in December 1993. Other developments related to 
implementation of deductive or disjunctive deductive databases have been cited 
earlier in this paper (see [141 and [581X 
In the introduction I presented Minsky’s arguments against using logic for 
commonsense reasoning that appeared in the appendix to his 1974 paper. I then 
presented the various approaches to nonmonotonic reasoning. Have these theories 
overcome Minsky’s objections? In a certain sense they have. They formalize 
commonsense reasoning to a certain extent. They have modified first-order logic to 
make it nonmonotonic. Minsky’s argument hat logic as traditionally understood is 
monotonic is correct, but the theories described in this paper use classical ogic as 
a basis and extend it to be nonmonotonic. That they can become inconsistent can 
be handled as described in the following references. Belnap [15, 161 has done 
fundamental work in dealing with inconsistent systems of logic. Some work has also 
been done by Baral, Kraus, Minker, and Subrahmanian [7] and by Grant and 
Subrahmanian [83] to handle inconsistent nonmonotonic theories. Step-logic, de- 
veloped by Elgot-Drapkin and Perlis [46], is another approach to dealing with 
nonmonotonic inconsistent theories. Blair and Subrahmanian [22] show how to 
reason formally in systems containing inconsistencies. Kifer and Krishnaprasad 
[102] develop a foundation for inheritance hierarchies based on these logics of 
inconsistency. However, more work is needed in dealing with inconsistent non- 
monotonic theories. 
As stated above, the field of nonmonotonic reasoning has made impressive steps 
in developing alternative theories, in showing some of the relationships among 
them, and in finding computational bounds on the various methods. Unfortunately, 
most of the bounds show that nonmonotonic reasoning is not tractable. As noted 
by Levesque [113], “ . , . it remains to be seen how the computational promise of 
nonmonotonic reasoning can be correctly realized.” That there are alternative 
theories is not, I believe, an impediment, since some of the theories solve problems 
that other theories cannot solve. There does not appear to be one “all embracing 
theory” that will handle everything, although some consider that the ultimate aim 
is to develop such a theory. See Lin and Shoham [1211 and Marek, Nerode, and 
Remmel [128] for attempts to develop a unifying framework. It is not clear that an 
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all embracing theory can be developed that will capture all of nonmonotonic 
reasoning. In attempting to develop such a theory, we may, however learn a great 
deal. 
In a certain sense we have still not solved the problem that Minsky posed. We 
have developed a large number of theories, but there has been little work done 
that provides guidelines as to which of these theories should be used and under 
what circumstances. It seems to me that if nonmonotonic reasoning is to become a 
reality, we must be able to provide answers to the following questions: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
What are the precise relationships among the various theories of nonmono- 
tonic reasoning? 
What are the conditions under which a particular nonmonotonic theory 
should be used? 
Given a particular theory, what are tractable classes of problems for which it 
is effective? 
Given large problems that may be either tractable or intractable, what are 
effective techniques that may be used to implement the theories? 
Are there approximations to the semantics of nonmonotonic reasoning that 
are sound and may be more tractable than the full theory? 
How does one select from alternative semantics for logic programs that 
contain different rules of default and classical negation? 
What additional characterizations of nonmonotonic reasoning can be devel- 
oped and how do they help in understanding or in developing new semantics 
[39, 40, 107, 111, 65]? 
Although partial answers to some of these questions exist, more work is needed. 
I believe that the above issues should be given more attention than that of 
developing additional theories of nonmonotonic reasoning or theories of negation 
in logic programming. I must admit that I am one of the perpetrators of the 
problem. Nevertheless, we cannot continue to develop new theories with new 
procedures without addressing the issues I have listed above. As noted by Marek 
and Subrahmanian [130], a thorough study of the interrelationships between 
differing formalisms for treating negation in logic programming is necessary as 
there are now too many formalisms. A continuation of the development of the 
logical characterization of general properties may assist in this process. It may 
provide tools to evaluate existing nonmonotonic reasoning formalisms and may 
lead to the development of new theories that satisfy the properties. 
Perhaps it will be possible to develop an automatic decision-maker to determine 
which nonmonotonic formalism should be used in a given context; however, I have 
my doubts as to the feasibility of such a system. We must also show practical 
problems where the theories may be applied. At the present time we have only 
addressed “toy” problems, with the notable exception of the work by Kowalski 
[lo61 on legal reasoning in the British naturalization laws and the VLSI design and 
other work on legal systems developed as part of Japan’s Fifth Generation Project 
1951. Although no papers have been published on the subject, I understand that the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation is implementing a very large Prolog program that 
uses the nonmonotonic features of the language. I have no objection to toy 
problems. Indeed, we need more toy problems as they elucidate some of the 
problems with the alternative theories. In this connection, Lifschitz has specified a 
list of benchmark problems whose solution in nonmonotonic reasoning would be 
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very productive ills]. However, work on large applications will lead to insight into 
scientific issues that must be addressed, tell us how practical our theories are, and 
potentially be of benefit to the military and to industry. The foundations of 
nonmonotonic reasoning have been sufficiently developed to warrant implementa- 
tions. 
Unless we do some, if not all, of the above, the complaints that Minsky and 
others have-that the work is nice from a logician’s view, but has little relevance to 
artificial intelligence-will remain. As evidenced by the work cited in this paper, 
we know a great deal about nonmonotonic reasoning, tractability, and logic 
programming, but we have not yet assimilated what to do with this knowledge. 
The theories that we develop are important in that they provide a semantics for 
nonmonotonic reasoning. A common mistaken critique of the use of logic or 
nonmonotonic reasoning is that one cannot use heuristics or deal with context. 
This critique is not relevant as it has been shown that whether or not we are 
dealing with a form of logic, heuristics can be used (e.g., which rule to select or 
which proof path should be explored first). It also has nothing to do with whether 
or not we can use bottom-up, top-down, or inside-out approaches to search. All of 
these are compatible with each approach to nonmonotonic reasoning. The intro- 
duction of context to an application is also compatible with logic and nonmono- 
tonic reasoning. How we implement the logic theory is another issue. 
In an invited paper that I gave at the Principles of Database Systems 11441, I 
stated: 
It seems to me that the fields of databases, logic programming, deductive databases, 
artificial intelligence, and expert systems will move towards one another. Formalisms 
and techniques developed in each of these areas will assist the others. Science builds 
upon theories. Theories developed for deductive databases and logic programming 
will, therefore, be built upon to further developments in the above subjects. 
The comments concerning artificial intelligence refer, of course, to nonmonotonic 
reasoning. If artificial intelligence is to be a mature science, formal theories are 
essential. Tractability results are also important, but it would seem that average 
case analyses might be even more important. It is clear from the results sketched in 
this paper that the fields of logic programming and nonmonotonic reasoning are on 
solid scientific ground and that significant results have been developed in both 
areas and in their relationships. I look forward to looking back at the field at the 
end of the decade of the 1990s. I am sure that we will have expanded our 
knowledge of nonmonotonic reasoning and logic programming and will have 
answers to some, if not all, of the questions I have posed. 
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